L. S. Marcolino, H. Xu, D. Gerber, B. Kolev, S. Price, E. Pantazis, and M. Tambe. 2015. “Agent Teams for Design Problems .” In International Workshop on Coordination, Organisations, Institutions and Norms (COIN 2015).
Design imposes a novel social choice problem: using a team
of voting agents, maximize the number of optimal solutions; allowing
a user to then take an aesthetical choice. In an open system of design
agents, team formation is fundamental. We present the first model of
agent teams for design. For maximum applicability, we envision agents
that are queried for a single opinion, and multiple solutions are obtained
by multiple iterations. We show that diverse teams composed of agents
with different preferences maximize the number of optimal solutions,
while uniform teams composed of multiple copies of the best agent are in
general suboptimal. Our experiments study the model in bounded time;
and we also study a real system, where agents vote to design buildings.