@conference {1499534, title = {Cyber Camouflage Games for Strategic Deception}, booktitle = {Conference on Decision and Game Theory for Security, 2019}, year = {2019}, abstract = {\ The rapid increase in cybercrime, causing a reported annual economicloss of $600 billion (Lewis, 2018), has prompted a critical need for effective cyber defense. Strategic criminals conduct network reconnaissance prior to executing attacks to avoid detection and establish situational awareness via scanningand fingerprinting tools. Cyber deception attempts to foil these reconnaissanceefforts by camouflaging network and system attributes to disguise valuable information. Game-theoretic models can identify decisions about strategically deceiving attackers, subject to domain constraints. For effectively deploying an optimaldeceptive strategy, modeling the objectives and the abilities of the attackers, is akey challenge. To address this challenge, we present Cyber Camouflage Games(CCG), a general-sum game model that captures attackers which can be diverselyequipped and motivated. We show that computing the optimal defender strategy isNP-hard even in the special case of unconstrained CCGs, and present an efficientapproximate solution for it. We further provide an MILP formulation acceleratedwith cut-augmentation for the general constrained problem. Finally, we provideexperimental evidence that our solution methods are efficient and effective.}, author = {Thakoor, Omkar and Tambe, Milind and Vayanos, Phebe and Haifeng Xu and Kiekintveld, Christopher and Feng, Fei} }