@conference {1499564,
	title = {Warning Time: Optimizing Strategic Signaling for Security Against Boundedly Rational Adversaries},
	booktitle = {International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (Extended Abstract) (AAMAS-19)},
	year = {2019},
	abstract = {Defender-attacker Stackelberg security games (SSGs) have beenapplied for solving many real-world security problems. Recent workin SSGs has incorporated a deceptive signaling scheme into theSSG model, where the defender strategically reveals informationabout her defensive strategy to the attacker, in order to inuencethe attacker{\textquoteright}s decision making for the defender{\textquoteright}s own benet. Inthis work, we study the problem of signaling in security gamesagainst a boundedly rational attacker.},
	author = {Cooney, Sarah and Vayanos, Phebe and Thanh H. Nguyen and Gonzalez, Cleotilde and Lebiere, Christian and Edward A. Cranford and Tambe, Milind}
}
