@conference {1500317,
	title = {Inducible Equilibrium for Security Games (Extended Abstract) },
	booktitle = {International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS-18) [short paper]},
	year = {2018},
	abstract = {Strong Stackelberg equilibrium (SSE) is the standard solution concept
of Stackelberg security games. The SSE assumes that the follower
breaks ties in favor of the leader and this is widely acknowledged
and justified by the assertion that the defender can often induce the
attacker to choose a preferred action by making an infinitesimal
adjustment to her strategy. Unfortunately, in security games with
resource assignment constraints, the assertion might not be valid.
To overcome this issue, inspired by the notion of inducibility and
the pessimistic Stackelberg equilibrium [20, 21], this paper presents
the inducible Stackelberg equilibrium (ISE), which is guaranteed
to exist and avoids overoptimism as the outcome can always be
induced with infinitesimal strategy deviation. Experimental evaluation unveils the significant overoptimism and sub-optimality of
SSE and thus, verifies the advantage of the ISE as an alternative
solution concept.},
	author = {Qingyu Guo and Jiarui Gan and Fang, Fei and Long Tran-Thanh and Tambe, Milind and An, Bo}
}
