@conference {1501443,
	title = {A Game Theoretic Approach on Addressing Collusion among Human Adversaries },
	booktitle = {Workshop on security and multiagent systems, International conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS)},
	year = {2016},
	abstract = {Several models have been proposed for Stackelberg security
games (SSGs) and protection against perfectly rational and
bounded rational adversaries; however, none of these existing models addressed the collusion mechanism between
adversaries. In a large number of studies related to SSGs,
there is one leader and one follower in the game such that
the leader takes action and the follower responds accordingly. These studies fail to take into account the possibility of existence of group of adversaries who can collude and
cause synergistic loss to the security agents (defenders). The
first contribution of this paper is formulating a new type of
Stackleberg security game involving a beneficial collusion
mechanism among adversaries. The second contribution of
this paper is to develop a parametric human behavior model
which is able to capture the bounded rationality of adversaries in this type of collusive games. This model is proposed
based on human subject experiments with participants on
Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT).},
	author = {Gholami, Shahrzad and Bryan Wilder and Brown, Matthew and Sinha, Arunesh and Sintov, Nicole and Tambe, Milind}
}
