@conference {1501448,
	title = {Multi-agent Team Formation for Design Problems },
	booktitle = {Coordination, Organizations, Institutions and Norms in Agent Systems XI. Springer-Verlag Lecture Notes in AI},
	year = {2016},
	abstract = {Design imposes a novel social choice problem: using a team of voting
agents, maximize the number of optimal solutions; allowing a user to then take
an aesthetical choice. In an open system of design agents, team formation is
fundamental. We present the first model of agent teams for design. For maximum
applicability, we envision agents that are queried for a single opinion, and multiple
solutions are obtained by multiple iterations. We show that diverse teams composed
of agents with different preferences maximize the number of optimal solutions,
while uniform teams composed of multiple copies of the best agent are in general
suboptimal. Our experiments study the model in bounded time; and we also study
a real system, where agents vote to design buildings.},
	author = {L. S. Marcolino and Xu, H. and D. Gerber and B. Kolev and S. Price and E. Pantazis and M. Tambe}
}
