@conference {1502687, title = {Information Disclosure as a Means to Security }, booktitle = {International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS)}, year = {2015}, abstract = {In this paper we present a novel Stackelberg-type model of security domains: Security Assets aSsignment with Information disclosure (SASI). The model combines both the features of the Stackelberg Security Games (SSGs) model and of the Bayesian Persuasion (BP) model. More specifically, SASI includes: a) an uncontrolled, exogenous security state that serves as the Defender{\textquoteright}s private information; b) multiple security assets with non-accumulating, targetlocal defence capability; c) a pro-active, verifiable and public, unidirectional information disclosure channel from the Defender to the Attacker. We show that SASI with a non-degenerate information disclosure can be arbitrarily more efficient, than a {\textquotedblleft}silent{\textquotedblright} Stackelberg assets allocation. We also provide a linear program reformulation of SASI that can be solved in polynomial time in SASI parameters. Furthermore, we show that it is possible to remove one of SASI parameters and, rather than require it as an input, recover it by computation. As a result, SASI becomes highly scalable.}, author = {Zinovi Rabinovich and Albert X. Jiang and Jain, Manish and Haifeng Xu} }