@conference {1502901,
	title = {Opportunistic Security Game: An Initial Report },
	booktitle = {International Joint Workshop on Optimization in Multi-Agent Systems and Distributed Constraint Reasoning (OPTMAS-DCR) In Conjunction with AAMAS 2014},
	year = {2014},
	address = {Paris, France},
	abstract = {This paper introduces a new game-theoretic framework and algorithms
for addressing opportunistic crime. Stackelberg Security Game (SSG), focused on
highly strategic and resourceful adversaries, has become an important computational framework within multiagent systems. Unfortunately, SSG is ill-suited as a
framework for handling opportunistic crimes, which are committed by criminals
who are less strategic in planning attacks and more flexible in executing them
than SSG assumes. Yet, opportunistic crime is what is commonly seen in most
urban settings. We therefore introduce Opportunistic Security Game (OSG), a
computational framework to recommend deployment strategies for defenders to
control opportunistic crimes. Our first contribution in OSG is a novel model for
opportunistic adversaries, who (i) opportunistically and repeatedly seek targets;
(ii) react to real-time information at execution time rather than planning attacks
in advance; and (iii) have limited observation of defender strategies. Our second
contribution to OSG is a new exact algorithm EOSG to optimize defender strategies given our opportunistic adversaries. Our third contribution is the development of a fast heuristic algorithm to solve large-scale OSG problems, exploiting
a compact representation. We use urban transportation systems as a critical motivating domain, and provide detailed experimental results based on a real-world
system.},
	author = {Zhang, Chao and Xin Jiang, Albert and Short, Martin and Jeffrey Brantingham and Tambe, Milind}
}
