@conference {1503638,
	title = {Defender (Mis)coordination in Security Games },
	booktitle = {International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI)},
	year = {2013},
	abstract = {We study security games with multiple defenders.
To achieve maximum security, defenders must perfectly synchronize their randomized allocations of
resources. However, in real-life scenarios (such as
protection of the port of Boston) this is not the case.
Our goal is to quantify the loss incurred by miscoordination between defenders, both theoretically
and empirically. We introduce two notions that
capture this loss under different assumptions: the
price of miscoordination, and the price of sequential commitment. Generally speaking, our theoretical bounds indicate that the loss may be extremely
high in the worst case, while our simulations establish a smaller yet significant loss in practice.},
	author = {Xin Jiang, Albert and Ariel D. Procaccia and Qian, Yundi and Nisarg Shah and Tambe, Milind}
}
