@conference {1504105,
	title = {Monotonic Maximin: A Robust Stackelberg Solution Against Boundedly Rational Followers },
	booktitle = {Conference on Decision and Game Theory for Security (GameSec)},
	year = {2013},
	abstract = {There has been recent interest in applying Stackelberg games to infrastructure security, in which a defender must protect targets from attack by an
adaptive adversary. In real-world security settings the adversaries are humans
and are thus boundedly rational. Most existing approaches for computing defender strategies against boundedly rational adversaries try to optimize against
specific behavioral models of adversaries, and provide no quality guarantee when
the estimated model is inaccurate. We propose a new solution concept, monotonic maximin, which provides guarantees against all adversary behavior models
satisfying monotonicity, including all in the family of Regular Quantal Response
functions. We propose a mixed-integer linear program formulation for computing
monotonic maximin. We also consider top-monotonic maximin, a related solution
concept that is more conservative, and propose a polynomial-time algorithm for
top-monotonic maximin.},
	author = {Xin Jiang, Albert and Thanh H. Nguyen and Tambe, Milind and Ariel D. Procaccia}
}
