@conference {1504351,
	title = {Challenges in Patrolling to Maximize Pristine Forest Area (Position Paper) },
	booktitle = {AAAI Spring Symposium on Game Theory for Security, Sustainability and Health},
	year = {2012},
	abstract = {Illegal extraction of forest resources is fought, in many
developing countries, by patrols through the forest that
seek to deter such activity by decreasing its profitability.
With limited resources for performing such patrols, a patrol strategy will seek to distribute the patrols throughout
the forest, in space and time, in order to minimize the resulting amount of extraction that occurs or maximize the
degree of forest protection, according to one of several
potential metrics. We pose this problem as a Stackelberg
game. We adopt and extend the simple, geometrically elegant model of (Robinson 2010). First, we study optimal
allocations of patrol density under generalizations of this
model, relaxing several of its assumptions. Second, we
pose the problem of generating actual schedules whose
site visit frequencies are consistent with the analytically
computed optimal patrol densities.},
	author = {Matthew P. Johnson and Fang, Fei and Yang, Rong and Tambe, Milind and Heidi Jo Albers}
}
