@conference {1504353,
	title = {Security Games with Limited Surveillance: An Initial Report},
	booktitle = {AAAI Spring Symposium on Game Theory for Security, Sustainability and Health},
	year = {2012},
	abstract = {Stackelberg games have been used in several deployed applications of game theory to make recommendations for allocating limited resources for protecting critical infrastructure. The resource allocation strategies are randomized to
prevent a strategic attacker from using surveillance to learn
and exploit patterns in the allocation. An important limitation of previous work on security games is that it typically
assumes that attackers have perfect surveillance capabilities,
and can learn the exact strategy of the defender. We introduce
a new model that explicitly models the process of an attacker observing a sequence of resource allocation decisions and
updating his beliefs about the defender{\textquoteright}s strategy. For this
model we present computational techniques for updating the
attacker{\textquoteright}s beliefs and computing optimal strategies for both
the attacker and defender, given a specific number of observations. We provide multiple formulations for computing the
defender{\textquoteright}s optimal strategy, including non-convex programming and a convex approximation. We also present an approximate method for computing the optimal length of time
for the attacker to observe the defender{\textquoteright}s strategy before attacking. Finally, we present experimental results comparing
the efficiency and runtime of our methods.},
	author = {An, Bo and David Kempe and Kiekintveld, Christopher and Shieh, Eric and Satinder Singh and Tambe, Milind and Vorobeychik, Yevgeniy}
}
