@conference {1504354,
	title = {PROTECT: A Deployed Game Theoretic System to Protect the Ports of the United States },
	booktitle = {International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS)	},
	year = {2012},
	abstract = {While three deployed applications of game theory for security have
recently been reported at AAMAS [12], we as a community remain in the early stages of these deployments; there is a continuing
need to understand the core principles for innovative security applications of game theory. Towards that end, this paper presents
PROTECT, a game-theoretic system deployed by the United States
Coast Guard (USCG) in the port of Boston for scheduling their patrols. USCG has termed the deployment of PROTECT in Boston a
success, and efforts are underway to test it in the port of New York,
with the potential for nationwide deployment.
PROTECT is premised on an attacker-defender Stackelberg game
model and offers five key innovations. First, this system is a departure from the assumption of perfect adversary rationality noted in
previous work, relying instead on a quantal response (QR) model
of the adversary{\textquoteright}s behavior {\textemdash} to the best of our knowledge, this
is the first real-world deployment of the QR model. Second, to
improve PROTECT{\textquoteright}s efficiency, we generate a compact representation of the defender{\textquoteright}s strategy space, exploiting equivalence and
dominance. Third, we show how to practically model a real maritime patrolling problem as a Stackelberg game. Fourth, our experimental results illustrate that PROTECT{\textquoteright}s QR model more robustly
handles real-world uncertainties than a perfect rationality model.
Finally, in evaluating PROTECT, this paper for the first time provides real-world data: (i) comparison of human-generated vs PROTECT security schedules, and (ii) results from an Adversarial Perspective Team{\textquoteright}s (human mock attackers) analysis.},
	author = {Shieh, Eric and An, Bo and Yang, Rong and Tambe, Milind and Baldwin, Craig and Joseph DiRenzo and Maule, Ben and Meyer, Garrett}
}
