@conference {1504356,
	title = {Towards Optimal Patrol Strategies for Fare Inspection in Transit Systems },
	booktitle = {AAAI Spring Symposium on Game Theory for Security, Sustainability and Health	},
	year = {2012},
	abstract = {In some urban transit systems, passengers are legally required
to purchase tickets before entering but are not physically
forced to do so. Instead, patrol units move about through
the transit system, inspecting tickets of passengers, who face
fines for fare evasion. This setting yields the problem of computing optimal patrol strategies satisfying certain temporal
and spacial constraints, to deter fare evasion and hence maximize revenue. In this paper we propose an initial model of
this problem as a leader-follower Stackelberg game. We then
formulate an LP relaxation of this problem and present initial
experimental results using real-world ridership data from the
Los Angeles Metro Rail system.},
	author = {Xin Jiang, Albert and Yin, Zhengyu and Matthew P. Johnson and Kiekintveld, Christopher and Leyton-Brown, Kevin and Tuomas Sandholm and Tambe, Milind}
}
