@conference {1504449,
	title = {Adversarial Patrolling Games: Extended Abstract },
	booktitle = {International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS) (Short paper)},
	year = {2012},
	abstract = {Defender-Attacker Stackelberg games are the foundations of tools
deployed for computing optimal patrolling strategies in adversarial domains such as the United states Federal Air Marshals Service
and the United States Coast Guard, among others. In Stackelberg
game models of these systems the attacker knows only the probability that each target is covered by the defender, but is oblivious to
the detailed timing of the coverage schedule. In many real-world
situations, however, the attacker can observe the current location of
the defender and can exploit this knowledge to reason about the
defender{\textquoteright}s future moves. We study Stackelberg security games
in which the defender sequentially moves between targets, with
moves constrained by an exogenously specified graph, while the attacker can observe the defender{\textquoteright}s current location and his (stochastic) policy concerning future moves.},
	author = {Vorobeychik, Yevgeniy and An, Bo and Tambe, Milind}
}
