@conference {1504816, title = {Modeling Human Bounded Rationality to Improve Defender Strategies in Network Security Games }, booktitle = {Workshop on Human-Agent Interaction Design and Models (HAIDM) at AAMAS }, year = {2012}, abstract = {In a Network Security Game (NSG), security agencies must allocate limited resources to protect targets embedded in a network, such as important buildings in a city road network. A recent line of work relaxed the perfectrationality assumption of human adversary and showed significant advantages of incorporating the bounded rationality adversary models in non-networked security domains. Given that real-world NSG are often extremely complex and hence very difficult for humans to solve, it is critical that we address human bounded rationality when designing defender strategies. To that end, the key contributions of this paper include: (i) comprehensive experiments with human subjects using a web-based game that we designed to simulate NSGs; (ii) new behavioral models of human adversary in NSGs, which we train with the data collected from human experiments; (iii) new algorithms for computing the defender optimal strategy against the new models.}, author = {Yang, Rong and Fang, Fei and Xin Jiang, Albert and Karthik Rajagopal and Tambe, Milind and Maheswaran, Rajiv} }