@inbook {1504824,
	title = {PROTECT in the Ports of Boston, New York and Beyond: Experiences in Deploying Stackelberg Security Games with Quantal Response},
	year = {2012},
	publisher = {Springer	},
	organization = {Springer	},
	abstract = {While three deployed applications of game theory for security have recently been reported at AAMAS [21], we as a community remain in the early stages
of these deployments; there is a continuing need to understand the core principles
for innovative security applications of game theory. Towards that end, this chapter
presents PROTECT, a game-theoretic system deployed by the United States Coast
Guard (USCG) in the port of Boston for scheduling their patrols. USCG has termed
the deployment of PROTECT in Boston a success, and efforts are underway to test
it in the port of New York, with the potential for nationwide deployment.
PROTECT is premised on an attacker-defender Stackelberg game model and offers five key innovations. First, this system is a departure from the assumption of
perfect adversary rationality noted in previous work, relying instead on a quantal response (QR) model of the adversary{\textquoteright}s behavior. To the best of our knowledge, this is
the first real-world deployment of the QR model. Second, to improve PROTECT{\textquoteright}s
efficiency, we generate a compact representation of the defender{\textquoteright}s strategy space,
exploiting equivalence and dominance. Third, we show how to practically model a
real maritime patrolling problem as a Stackelberg game. Fourth, our experimental
results illustrate that PROTECT{\textquoteright}s QR model more robustly handles real-world uncertainties than a perfect rationality model does. Finally, in evaluating PROTECT,
this chapter provides real-world data: (i) comparison of human-generated vs. PROTECT security schedules, and (ii) results from an Adversarial Perspective Team{\textquoteright}s
(human mock attackers) analysis.},
	author = {Shieh, Eric and An, Bo and Yang, Rong and Tambe, Milind and Baldwin, Craig and Joseph DiRenzo and Maule, Ben and Meyer, Garrett and Moretti, Kathryn}
}
