@conference {1505305,
	title = {Security Games on Social Networks },
	booktitle = {AAAI Fall Symposium, 2012	},
	year = {2012},
	abstract = {Many real-world problems exhibit competitive situations in
which a defender (a defending agent, agency, or organization) has to address misinformation spread by its adversary,
e.g., health organizations cope with vaccination-related misinformation provided by anti-vaccination groups. The rise of
social networks has allowed misinformation to be easily and
quickly diffused to a large community. Taking into account
knowledge of its adversary{\textquoteright}s actions, the defender has to seek
efficient strategies to limit the influence of the spread of misinformation by the opponent.
In this paper, we address this problem as a blocking influence
maximization problem using a game-theoretic approach. Two
players strategically select a number of seed nodes in the social network that could initiate their own influence propagation. While the adversary attempts to maximize its negative
influence, the defender tries to minimize this influence. We
represent the problem as a zero-sum game and apply the Double Oracle algorithm to solve the game in combination with
various heuristics for oracle phases. Our experimental results
reveal that by using the game theoretic approach, we are able
to significantly reduce the negative influence in comparison
to when the defender does not do anything. In addition, we
propose using an approximation of the payoff matrix, making
the algorithms scalable to large real-world networks.},
	author = {Thanh H. Nguyen and Tsai, Jason and Jiang, Albert and Bowring, Emma and Maheswaran, Rajiv and Tambe, Milind}
}
