Inducible Equilibrium for Security Games (Extended Abstract)


Qingyu Guo, Jiarui Gan, Fei Fang, Long Tran-Thanh, Milind Tambe, and Bo An. 2018. “Inducible Equilibrium for Security Games (Extended Abstract) .” In International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS-18) [short paper].


Strong Stackelberg equilibrium (SSE) is the standard solution concept of Stackelberg security games. The SSE assumes that the follower breaks ties in favor of the leader and this is widely acknowledged and justified by the assertion that the defender can often induce the attacker to choose a preferred action by making an infinitesimal adjustment to her strategy. Unfortunately, in security games with resource assignment constraints, the assertion might not be valid. To overcome this issue, inspired by the notion of inducibility and the pessimistic Stackelberg equilibrium [20, 21], this paper presents the inducible Stackelberg equilibrium (ISE), which is guaranteed to exist and avoids overoptimism as the outcome can always be induced with infinitesimal strategy deviation. Experimental evaluation unveils the significant overoptimism and sub-optimality of SSE and thus, verifies the advantage of the ISE as an alternative solution concept.
See also: 2018