Security Games with Contagion: Handling Asymmetric Information

Citation:

Jason Tsai, Yundi Qian, Yevgeniy Vorobeychik, Christopher Kiekintveld, and Milind Tambe. 2013. “Security Games with Contagion: Handling Asymmetric Information .” In International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS) [SHORT PAPER].

Abstract:

Counterinsurgency, which is the effort to mitigate support for an opposing organization, is one such domain that has been studied recently and past work has modeled the problem as an influence blocking maximization that features an influencer and a mitigator. While past work has introduced scalable heuristic techniques for generating effective strategies using a double oracle algorithm, it has not addressed the issue of uncertainty and asymmetric information, which is the topic of this paper.
See also: 2013