Sarah Cooney, Phebe Vayanos, Thanh H. Nguyen, Cleotilde Gonzalez, Christian Lebiere, Edward A. Cranford, and Milind Tambe. 2019. “Warning Time: Optimizing Strategic Signaling for Security Against Boundedly Rational Adversaries.” In International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (Extended Abstract) (AAMAS-19).
Abstract:Defender-attacker Stackelberg security games (SSGs) have been
applied for solving many real-world security problems. Recent work
in SSGs has incorporated a deceptive signaling scheme into the
SSG model, where the defender strategically reveals information
about her defensive strategy to the attacker, in order to inuence
the attacker’s decision making for the defender’s own benet. In
this work, we study the problem of signaling in security games
against a boundedly rational attacker.