2012
Jun-young Kwak, Pradeep Varakantham, Rajiv Maheswaran, Milind Tambe, Farrokh Jazizadeh, Geoffrey Kavulya, Laura Klein, Burcin Becerik-Gerber, Timothy Hayes, and Wendy Wood. 2012. “
Sustainable Multiagent Application to Conserve Energy .” In International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS) Demonstration Track .
AbstractLimited availability of energy resources has motivated the need
for developing efficient measures of conserving energy. Conserving energy in commercial buildings is an important goal since these
buildings consume significant amount of energy, e.g., 46.2% of
all building energy and 18.4% of total energy consumption in the
US [1]. This demonstration focuses on a novel application to be
deployed at Ralph & Goldy Lewis Hall (RGL) at the University
of Southern California as a practical research testbed to optimize
multiple competing objectives: i) energy use in the building; ii)
occupants’ comfort level; and iii) practical usage considerations.
This demonstration complements our paper in the AAMAS innovative applications track [4], presenting a novel multiagent building application for sustainability called SAVES (Sustainable multiAgent systems for optimizing Variable objectives including Energy
and Satisfaction). This writeup will provide a high-level overview
of SAVES and focus more on the proposed demonstration, but readers are referred to [4] for a more technical description. SAVES provides three key contributions: (i) jointly performed with the university facility management team, our research is based on actual
building and occupant data as well as real sensors and devices, etc.;
(ii) it focuses on non-residential buildings, where human occupants
do not have a direct financial incentive in saving energy; and (iii)
SAVES uses a novel algorithm for generating optimal BM-MDP
(Bounded parameter Multi-objective MDP) policies.
We demonstrate SAVES to show how to achieve significant energy savings and comparable average satisfaction level of occupants while emphasizing the interactive aspects of our application.
2012_21_teamcore_aamas12-energy-demo-camera-ready.pdf Albert Xin Jiang, Zhengyu Yin, Matthew P. Johnson, Christopher Kiekintveld, Kevin Leyton-Brown, Tuomas Sandholm, and Milind Tambe. 2012. “
Towards Optimal Patrol Strategies for Fare Inspection in Transit Systems .” In AAAI Spring Symposium on Game Theory for Security, Sustainability and Health .
AbstractIn some urban transit systems, passengers are legally required
to purchase tickets before entering but are not physically
forced to do so. Instead, patrol units move about through
the transit system, inspecting tickets of passengers, who face
fines for fare evasion. This setting yields the problem of computing optimal patrol strategies satisfying certain temporal
and spacial constraints, to deter fare evasion and hence maximize revenue. In this paper we propose an initial model of
this problem as a leader-follower Stackelberg game. We then
formulate an LP relaxation of this problem and present initial
experimental results using real-world ridership data from the
Los Angeles Metro Rail system.
2012_10_teamcore_trustsrail.pdf Jun-young Kwak, Pradeep Varakantham, Rajiv Maheswaran, Milind Tambe, Timothy Hayes, Wendy Wood, and Burcin Becerik-Gerber. 2012. “
Towards Robust Multi-objective Optimization Under Model Uncertainty for Energy Conservation .” In Workshop on Agent Technologies for Energy Systems (ATES) at AAMAS .
Abstractto the significant growth in energy usage. Building multiagent systems for real-world energy applications raises several research challenges regarding scalability, optimizing multiple competing objectives, model uncertainty, and complexity in deploying the system.
Motivated by these challenges, this paper proposes a new approach
to effectively conserve building energy. This work contributes to a
very new area that requires considering large-scale multi-objective
optimization as well as uncertainty over occupant preferences when
negotiating energy reduction. There are three major contributions.
We (i) develop a new method called HRMM to compute robust
solutions in practical situations; (ii) experimentally show that obtained strategies from HRMM converge to near-optimal solutions;
and (iii) provide a systematic way to tightly incorporate the insights
from human subject studies into our computational model and algorithms. The HRMM method is verified in a validated simulation
testbed in terms of energy savings and comfort levels of occupants
2012_30_teamcore_ates12-workshop-camera-ready-final.pdf Zhengyu Yin, Albert Xin Jiang, Milind Tambe, Christopher Kiekintveld, Kevin Leyton-Brown, Tuomas Sandholm, and John P. Sullivan. 2012. “
TRUSTS: Scheduling Randomized Patrols for Fare Inspection in Transit Systems using Game Theory .” AI Magazine, 33 , 4 , Pp. 59-72.
AbstractIn proof-of-payment transit systems, passengers are legally
required to purchase tickets before entering but are not physically forced to do so. Instead, patrol units move about the
transit system, inspecting the tickets of passengers, who face
fines if caught fare evading. The deterrence of fare evasion
depends on the unpredictability and effectiveness of the patrols.
In this paper, we present TRUSTS, an application for scheduling randomized patrols for fare inspection in transit systems.
TRUSTS models the problem of computing patrol strategies as a leader-follower Stackelberg game where the objective is to deter fare evasion and hence maximize revenue. This problem differs from previously studied Stackelberg settings in that the leader strategies must satisfy massive
temporal and spatial constraints; moreover, unlike in these
counterterrorism-motivated Stackelberg applications, a large
fraction of the ridership might realistically consider fare evasion, and so the number of followers is potentially huge.
A third key novelty in our work is deliberate simplification
of leader strategies to make patrols easier to be executed.
We present an efficient algorithm for computing such patrol
strategies and present experimental results using real-world
ridership data from the Los Angeles Metro Rail system. The
Los Angeles County Sheriff’s department is currently carrying out trials of TRUSTS.
2012_45_teamcore_aimag-trusts.pdf Zhengyu Yin, Albert Jiang, Matthew Johnson, Milind Tambe, Christopher Kiekintveld, Kevin Leyton-Brown, Tuomas Sandholm, and John Sullivan. 2012. “
TRUSTS: Scheduling Randomized Patrols for Fare Inspection in Transit Systems .” In Conference on Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence (IAAI) .
AbstractIn proof-of-payment transit systems, passengers are legally
required to purchase tickets before entering but are not physically forced to do so. Instead, patrol units move about the
transit system, inspecting the tickets of passengers, who face
fines if caught fare evading. The deterrence of such fines depends on the unpredictability and effectiveness of the patrols.
In this paper, we present TRUSTS, an application for scheduling randomized patrols for fare inspection in transit systems.
TRUSTS models the problem of computing patrol strategies as a leader-follower Stackelberg game where the objective is to deter fare evasion and hence maximize revenue. This problem differs from previously studied Stackelberg settings in that the leader strategies must satisfy massive
temporal and spatial constraints; moreover, unlike in these
counterterrorism-motivated Stackelberg applications, a large
fraction of the ridership might realistically consider fare evasion, and so the number of followers is potentially huge.
A third key novelty in our work is deliberate simplification
of leader strategies to make patrols easier to be executed.
We present an efficient algorithm for computing such patrol strategies and present experimental results using realworld ridership data from the Los Angeles Metro Rail system. The Los Angeles Sheriff’s department has begun trials
of TRUSTS.
2012_13_teamcore_matchextendedabstract.pdf Zhengyu Yin and Milind Tambe. 2012. “
A Unified Method for Handling Discrete and Continuous Uncertainty in Bayesian Stackelberg Games .” In International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS).
AbstractGiven their existing and potential real-world security applications,
Bayesian Stackelberg games have received significant research interest [3, 12, 8]. In these games, the defender acts as a leader, and
the many different follower types model the uncertainty over discrete attacker types. Unfortunately since solving such games is an
NP-hard problem, scale-up has remained a difficult challenge.
This paper scales up Bayesian Stackelberg games, providing a
novel unified approach to handling uncertainty not only over discrete follower types but also other key continuously distributed real
world uncertainty, due to the leader’s execution error, the follower’s
observation error, and continuous payoff uncertainty. To that end,
this paper provides contributions in two parts. First, we present a
new algorithm for Bayesian Stackelberg games, called HUNTER,
to scale up the number of types. HUNTER combines the following five key features: i) efficient pruning via a best-first search of
the leader’s strategy space; ii) a novel linear program for computing tight upper bounds for this search; iii) using Bender’s decomposition for solving the upper bound linear program efficiently;
iv) efficient inheritance of Bender’s cuts from parent to child; v)
an efficient heuristic branching rule. Our experiments show that
HUNTER provides orders of magnitude speedups over the best existing methods to handle discrete follower types. In the second part,
we show HUNTER’s efficiency for Bayesian Stackelberg games
can be exploited to also handle the continuous uncertainty using
sample average approximation. We experimentally show that our
HUNTER-based approach also outperforms latest robust solution
methods under continuously distributed uncertainty.
2012_11_teamcore_hunter-aamas12.pdf Manish Jain, Kevin Leyton-Brown, and Milind Tambe. 2012. “
Which Security Games are Hard to Solve? .” In AAAI Spring Symposium on Game Theory for Security, Sustainability and Health .
AbstractStackelberg security games form the backbone of systems
like ARMOR, IRIS and PROTECT, which are in regular use
by the Los Angeles International Police, US Federal Air Marshal Service and the US Coast Guard respectively. An understanding of the runtime required by algorithms that power
such systems is critical to furthering the application of game
theory to other real-world domains. This paper identifies
the concept of the deployment-to-saturation ratio in random
Stackelberg security games, and shows that in a decision
problem related to these games, the probability that a solution
exists exhibits a phase transition as the ratio crosses 0.5. We
demonstrate that this phase transition is invariant to changes
both in the domain and the domain representation. Moreover, problem instances at this phase transition point are computationally harder than instances with other deployment-tosaturation ratios for a wide range of different equilibrium
computation methods, including (i) previously published different MIP algorithms, and (ii) different underlying solvers
and solution mechanisms. Our findings have at least two important implications. First, it is important for new algorithms
to be evaluated on the hardest problem instances. We show
that this has often not been done in the past, and introduce a
publicly available benchmark suite to facilitate such comparisons. Second, we provide evidence that this phase transition
region is also one where optimization would be of most benefit to security agencies, and thus requires significant attention
from researchers in this area.
2012_20_teamcore_aaaiss_manish.pdf Manish Jain, Bo An, and Milind Tambe. 2012. “
An Overview of Recent Application Trends at the AAMAS conference: Security, Sustainability and Safety.” AI Magazine, 33, 3, Pp. 14-28.
AbstractA key feature of the AAMAS conference is its emphasis on ties to real-world applications. The focus of this article is to provide a broad overview of application-focused papers published at the AAMAS 2010 and 2011 conferences. More specifically, recent applications at AAMAS could be broadly categorized as belonging to research areas of security, sustainability and safety. We outline the domains of applications, key research thrusts underlying each such application area, and emerging trends.
2012_1_teamcore_aimag2012.pdf Jason Tsai, Thanh H. Nguyen, and Milind Tambe. 2012. “
Security Games for Controlling Contagion.” In Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI).
AbstractMany strategic actions carry a ‘contagious’ component beyond the immediate locale of the effort itself. Viral marketing and peacekeeping operations have both been observed to have a spreading effect. In this work, we use counterinsurgency as our illustrative domain. Defined as the effort to block the spread of support for an insurgency, such operations lack the manpower to defend the entire population and must focus on the opinions of a subset of local leaders. As past researchers of security resource allocation have done, we propose using game theory to develop such policies and model the interconnected network of leaders as a graph. Unlike this past work in security games, actions in these domains possess a probabilistic, non-local impact. To address this new class of security games, we combine recent research in influence blocking maximization with a double oracle approach and create novel heuristic oracles to generate mixed strategies for a real-world leadership network from Afghanistan, synthetic leadership networks, and a real social network. We find that leadership networks that exhibit highly interconnected clusters can be solved equally well by our heuristic methods, but our more sophisticated heuristics outperform simpler ones in less interconnected social networks.
2012_27_teamcore_aaai2012_-_camerareadyv6.pdf 2011
Manish Jain, Zhengyu Yin, Milind Tambe, and Fernando Ordonez. 2011. “
Addressing Execution and Observation Error in Security Games .” In AAAI'11 Workshop on Applied Adversarial Reasoning and Risk Modeling (AARM).
AbstractAttacker-defender Stackelberg games have become a popular
game-theoretic approach for security with deployments for
LAX Police, the FAMS and the TSA. Unfortunately, most of
the existing solution approaches do not model two key uncertainties of the real-world: there may be noise in the defender’s
execution of the suggested mixed strategy and/or the observations made by an attacker can be noisy. In this paper, we analyze a framework to model these uncertainties, and demonstrate that previous strategies perform poorly in such uncertain settings. We also analyze RECON, a novel algorithm that
computes strategies for the defender that are robust to such
uncertainties, and explore heuristics that further improve RECON’s efficiency.
2011_30_teamcore_aarm11_recon.pdf Matthew Brown, Emma Bowring, Shira Epstein, Mufaddal Jhaveri, Rajiv Maheswaran, Parag Mallick, Shannon Mumenthaler, Michelle Povinelli, and Milind Tambe. 2011. “
Applying Multi-Agent Techniques to Cancer Modeling .” In Workshop on Multiagent Sequential Decision Making in Uncertain Domains(MSDM) at AAMAS 2011 .
AbstractEach year, cancer is responsible for 13% of all deaths worldwide.
In the United States, that percentage increases to 25%, translating
to an estimated 569,490 deaths in 2010 [1]. Despite significant
advances in the fight against cancer, these statistics make clear the
need for additional research into new treatments. As such, there has
been growing interest in the use of computer simulations as a tool
to aid cancer researchers. We propose an innovative multi-agent
approach in which healthy cells and cancerous cells are modeled
as opposing teams of agents using a decentralized Markov decision
process (DEC-MDP). We then describe changes made to traditional
DEC-MDP algorithms in order to better handle the complexity and
scale of our domain. We conclude by presenting and analyzing
preliminary simulation results. This paper is intended to introduce
the cancer modeling domain to the multi-agent community with
the hope of fostering a discussion about the opportunities and challenges it presents. Given the complexity of the domain, we do not
claim our approach to be a definitive solution but rather a first step
toward the larger goal of creating realistic simulations of cancer.
2011_16_teamcore_msdm2011_brown.pdf Christopher Kiekintveld, Janusz Marecki, and Milind Tambe. 2011. “
Approximation Methods for Infinite Bayesian Stackelberg Games: Modeling Distributional Payoff Uncertainty.” In International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems.
AbstractGame theory is fast becoming a vital tool for reasoning about complex real-world security problems, including critical infrastructure
protection. The game models for these applications are constructed
using expert analysis and historical data to estimate the values of
key parameters, including the preferences and capabilities of terrorists. In many cases, it would be natural to represent uncertainty over
these parameters using continuous distributions (such as uniform
intervals or Gaussians). However, existing solution algorithms are
limited to considering a small, finite number of possible attacker
types with different payoffs. We introduce a general model of infinite Bayesian Stackelberg security games that allows payoffs to be
represented using continuous payoff distributions. We then develop
several techniques for finding approximate solutions for this class
of games, and show empirically that our methods offer dramatic
improvements over the current state of the art, providing new ways
to improve the robustness of security game models.
2011_9_teamcore_aamas11_kiekintveld.pdf Zhengyu Yin and Milind Tambe. 2011. “
Continuous Time Planning for Multiagent Teams with Temporal Constraints .” In International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI).
AbstractContinuous state DEC-MDPs are critical for agent
teams in domains involving resources such as time,
but scaling them up is a significant challenge. To
meet this challenge, we first introduce a novel
continuous-time DEC-MDP model that exploits
transition independence in domains with temporal
constraints. More importantly, we present a new locally optimal algorithm called SPAC. Compared to
the best previous algorithm, SPAC finds solutions
of comparable quality substantially faster; SPAC
also scales to larger teams of agents.
2011_24_teamcore_ijcai11_mctmdp.pdf Matthew E. Taylor, Manish Jain, Prateek Tandon, Milind Tambe, and Makoto Yokoo. 2011. “
Distributed On-line Multi-Agent Optimization Under Uncertainty: Balancing Exploration and Exploitation .” In Advances in Complex Systems.
AbstractA significant body of work exists on effectively allowing multiple agents to coordinate to achieve a shared goal. In particular, a growing body of work in the Distributed
Constraint Optimization (DCOP) framework enables such coordination with different
amounts of teamwork. Such algorithms can implicitly or explicitly trade-off improved
solution quality with increased communication and computation requirements. However, the DCOP framework is limited to planning problems; DCOP agents must have
complete and accurate knowledge about the reward function at plan time.
We extend the DCOP framework, defining the Distributed Coordination of Exploration and Exploitation (DCEE) problem class to address real-world problems, such as
ad-hoc wireless network optimization, via multiple novel algorithms. DCEE algorithms
differ from DCOP algorithms in that they (1) are limited to a finite number of actions
in a single trial, (2) attempt to maximize the on-line, rather than final, reward, (3) are
unable to exhaustively explore all possible actions, and (4) may have knowledge about
the distribution of rewards in the environment, but not the rewards themselves. Thus, a
DCEE problem is not a type of planning problem, as DCEE algorithms must carefully
balance and coordinate multiple agents’ exploration and exploitation.
Two classes of algorithms are introduced: static estimation algorithms perform simple calculations that allow agents to either stay or explore, and balanced exploration
algorithms use knowledge about the distribution of the rewards and the time remaining
in an experiment to decide whether to stay, explore, or (in some algorithms) backtrack to
a previous location. These two classes of DCEE algorithms are compared in simulation
and on physical robots in a complex mobile ad-hoc wireless network setting. Contrary to our expectations, we found that increasing teamwork in DCEE algorithms may lower
team performance. In contrast, agents running DCOP algorithms improve their reward
as teamwork increases. We term this previously unknown phenomenon the team uncertainty penalty, analyze it in both simulation and on robots, and present techniques to
ameliorate the penalty.
2011_20_teamcore_11acs_taylor_revision.pdf Manish Jain, Dmytro Korzhyk, Ondrej Vanek, Vincent Conitzer, Michal Pechoucek, and Milind Tambe. 2011. “
A Double Oracle Algorithm for Zero-Sum Security Games on Graphs .” In International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems.
AbstractIn response to the Mumbai attacks of 2008, the Mumbai police
have started to schedule a limited number of inspection checkpoints
on the road network throughout the city. Algorithms for similar
security-related scheduling problems have been proposed in recent
literature, but security scheduling in networked domains when targets have varying importance remains an open problem at large.
In this paper, we cast the network security problem as an attackerdefender zero-sum game. The strategy spaces for both players are
exponentially large, so this requires the development of novel, scalable techniques.
We first show that existing algorithms for approximate solutions
can be arbitrarily bad in general settings. We present RUGGED
(Randomization in Urban Graphs by Generating strategies for Enemy and Defender), the first scalable optimal solution technique for
such network security games. Our technique is based on a double
oracle approach and thus does not require the enumeration of the
entire strategy space for either of the players. It scales up to realistic
problem sizes, as is shown by our evaluation of maps of southern
Mumbai obtained from GIS data.
2011_7_teamcore_666_jain2011b.pdf Jason Tsai, Emma Bowring, Stacy Marsella, and Milind Tambe. 2011. “
Empirical Evaluation of Computational Emotional Contagion Models .” In International Conference on Intelligent Virtual Agents (IVA).
AbstractIn social psychology, emotional contagion describes the widely observed phenomenon of one person’s emotions being influenced by surrounding people’s emotions. While the overall effect is agreed upon, the underlying mechanism of the spread of emotions has seen little quantification and application to computational agents despite extensive evidence of its impacts in everyday life. In this paper, we examine computational models of emotional contagion by implementing two models ([2] and [8]) that draw from two separate lines of contagion research: thermodynamics-based and epidemiological-based. We first perform sensitivity tests on each model in an evacuation simulation, ESCAPES, showing both models to be reasonably robust to parameter variations with certain exceptions. We then compare their ability to reproduce a real crowd panic scene in simulation, showing that the thermodynamics-style model ([2]) produces superior results due to the ill-suited contagion mechanism at the core of epidemiological models. We also identify that a graduated effect of fear and proximity-based contagion effects are key to producing the superior results. We then reproduce the methodology on a second video, showing that the same results hold, implying generality of the conclusions reached in the first scene.
2011_33_teamcore_tsai_iva.pdf Jason Tsai, Natalie Fridman, Emma Bowring, Matthew Brown, Shira Epstein, Gal Kaminka, Stacy Marsella, Andrew Ogden, Inbal Rika, Ankur Sheel, Matthew Taylor, Xuezhi Wang, Avishay Zilka, and Milind Tambe. 2011. “
ESCAPES - Evacuation Simulation with Children, Authorities, Parents, Emotions, and Social comparison .” In International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems.
AbstractIn creating an evacuation simulation for training and planning, realistic agents that reproduce known phenomenon are required. Evacuation simulation in the airport domain requires additional features
beyond most simulations, including the unique behaviors of firsttime visitors who have incomplete knowledge of the area and families that do not necessarily adhere to often-assumed pedestrian
behaviors. Evacuation simulations not customized for the airport
domain do not incorporate the factors important to it, leading to
inaccuracies when applied to it.
In this paper, we describe ESCAPES, a multiagent evacuation
simulation tool that incorporates four key features: (i) different
agent types; (ii) emotional interactions; (iii) informational interactions; (iv) behavioral interactions. Our simulator reproduces phenomena observed in existing studies on evacuation scenarios and
the features we incorporate substantially impact escape time. We
use ESCAPES to model the International Terminal at Los Angeles
International Airport (LAX) and receive high praise from security
officials.
2011_11_teamcore_aamas11_tsai.pdf Rong Yang, Milind Tambe, Manish Jain, Jun-young Kwak, James Pita, and Zhengyu Yin. 2011. “
Game Theory and Human Behavior: Challenges in Security and Sustainability .” In Algorithmic Decision Theory (ADT) .
AbstractSecurity and sustainability are two critical global challenges
that involve the interaction of many intelligent actors. Game theory provides a sound mathematical framework to model such interactions, and
computational game theory in particular has a promising role to play in
helping to address key aspects of these challenges. Indeed, in the domain
of security, we have already taken some encouraging steps by successfully
applying game-theoretic algorithms to real-world security problems: our
algorithms are in use by agencies such as the US coast guard, the Federal
Air Marshals Service, the LAX police and the Transportation Security
Administration. While these applications of game-theoretic algorithms
have advanced the state of the art, this paper lays out some key challenges as we continue to expand the use of these algorithms in real-world
domains. One such challenge in particular is that classical game theory
makes a set of assumptions of the players, which may not be consistent with real-world scenarios, especially when humans are involved. To
actually model human behavior within game-theoretic framework, it is
important to address the new challenges that arise due to the presence of
human players: (i) human bounded rationality; (ii) limited observations
and imperfect strategy execution; (iii) large action spaces. We present
initial solutions to these challenges in context of security games. For sustainability, we lay out our initial efforts and plans, and key challenges
related to human behavior in the loop.
2011_35_teamcore_adt11_camera_ready.pdf James Pita, Milind Tambe, Chris Kiekintveld, Shane Cullen, and Erin Steigerwald. 2011. “
GUARDS - Game Theoretic Security Allocation on a National Scale.” In International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems .
AbstractBuilding on research previously reported at AAMAS conferences,
this paper describes an innovative application of a novel gametheoretic approach for a national scale security deployment. Working with the United States Transportation Security Administration
(TSA), we have developed a new application called GUARDS to
assist in resource allocation tasks for airport protection at over 400
United States airports. In contrast with previous efforts such as ARMOR and IRIS, which focused on one-off tailored applications and
one security activity (e.g. canine patrol or checkpoints) per application, GUARDS faces three key issues: (i) reasoning about hundreds
of heterogeneous security activities; (ii) reasoning over diverse potential threats; (iii) developing a system designed for hundreds of
end-users. Since a national deployment precludes tailoring to specific airports, our key ideas are: (i) creating a new game-theoretic
framework that allows for heterogeneous defender activities and
compact modeling of a large number of threats; (ii) developing
an efficient solution technique based on general purpose Stackelberg game solvers; (iii) taking a partially centralized approach for
knowledge acquisition and development of the system. In doing so
we develop a software scheduling assistant, GUARDS, designed to
reason over two agents — the TSA and a potential adversary —
and allocate the TSA’s limited resources across hundreds of security activities in order to provide protection within airports.
The scheduling assistant has been delivered to the TSA and is
currently under evaluation and testing for scheduling practices at
an undisclosed airport. If successful, the TSA intends to incorporate the system into their unpredictable scheduling practices nationwide. In this paper we discuss the design choices and challenges
encountered during the implementation of GUARDS. GUARDS
represents promising potential for transitioning years of academic
research into a nationally deployed system.
2011_8_teamcore_guards_ind.pdf James Pita, Milind Tambe, Christopher Kiekintveld, Shane Cullen, and Erin Steigerwald. 2011. “
GUARDS - Innovative Application of Game Theory for National Airport Security .” In International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI).
AbstractWe describe an innovative application of a novel
game-theoretic approach for a national scale security deployment. Working with the United States
Transportation Security Administration (TSA), we
have developed a new application called GUARDS
to allocate the TSA’s limited resources across hundreds of security activities to provide protection
at over 400 United States airports. Similar security applications (e.g., ARMOR and IRIS) have focused on one-off tailored applications and one security activity (e.g. checkpoints) per application,
GUARDS on the other hand faces three new key
issues: (i) reasoning about hundreds of heterogeneous security activities; (ii) reasoning over diverse
potential threats; (iii) developing a system designed
for hundreds of end-users. Since a national deployment precludes tailoring to specific airports, our
key ideas are: (i) creating a new game-theoretic
framework that allows for heterogeneous defender
activities and compact modeling of a large number
of threats; (ii) developing an efficient solution technique based on general purpose Stackelberg game
solvers; (iii) taking a partially centralized approach
for knowledge acquisition. The scheduling assistant has been delivered to the TSA and is currently
undergoing evaluation for scheduling practices at
an undisclosed airport. If successful, the TSA intends to incorporate the system into their unpredictable scheduling practices nationwide.
2011_22_teamcore_guards_ind2.pdf