I am a Ph.D candidate in Department of Computer Science, University of Southern California. I am a member of TEAMCORE research group directed by Professor Milind Tambe. I received my bachelor degree from Department of Computer Science, Tsinghua University, Beijing, China. My Curriculum Vitae.
Email: zhengyuy@usc.edu
Office phone: (213) 740-7231
Office Address: Powell Hall of Engineering 210, 3737 Watt Way, Los Angeles, CA 90089-0781, USA
I have research interests in artificial intelligence, algorithmic game theory and optimization and decision making under uncertainty.
My research focuses on addressing various types of uncertainty in Stackelberg games arising from real world security applications. The use of game-theoretic concepts has allowed security forces to exert maximum leverage with limited resources. Indeed, the leader-follower Stackelberg game model is at heart of many deployed applications. Due to the adversarial environment and the nature of law enforcement activities, many types of uncertainty, such as execution, observation, and preference uncertainty, must be taken into account in game-theoretic modeling for practical security applications.
In particular, I seek to address two major challenges. First, I am interested in mathematical modeling of uncertainty that may arise in real world deployments. Second, I am interested in developing compact game representation and efficient solution techniques so that solving the uncertainty model of interest is computationally feasible (check out my RECON paper and HUNTER paper). I have applied game-theoretic solutions to the problem of fare evasion deterrence in public transit networks. The project is carried out in collaboration with the Los Angeles Sheriff's Department and is currently under evaluation for the Los Angeles Metro Rail system. (check out the original paper and its extension.)
