Publications

2012
Jun-young Kwak, Pradeep Varakantham, Rajiv Maheswaran, Milind Tambe, Farrokh Jazizadeh, Geoffrey Kavulya, Laura Klein, Burcin Becerik-Gerber, Timothy Hayes, and Wendy Wood. 2012. “SAVES: A Sustainable Multiagent Application to Conserve Building Energy Considering Occupants .” In International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS) .Abstract
This paper describes an innovative multiagent system called SAVES with the goal of conserving energy in commercial buildings. We specifically focus on an application to be deployed in an existing university building that provides several key novelties: (i) jointly performed with the university facility management team, SAVES is based on actual occupant preferences and schedules, actual energy consumption and loss data, real sensors and hand-held devices, etc.; (ii) it addresses novel scenarios that require negotiations with groups of building occupants to conserve energy; (iii) it focuses on a non-residential building, where human occupants do not have a direct financial incentive in saving energy and thus requires a different mechanism to effectively motivate occupants; and (iv) SAVES uses a novel algorithm for generating optimal MDP policies that explicitly consider multiple criteria optimization (energy and personal comfort) as well as uncertainty over occupant preferences when negotiating energy reduction – this combination of challenges has not been considered in previous MDP algorithms. In a validated simulation testbed, we show that SAVES substantially reduces the overall energy consumption compared to the existing control method while achieving comparable average satisfaction levels for occupants. As a real-world test, we provide results of a trial study where SAVES is shown to lead occupants to conserve energy in real buildings.
2012_9_teamcore_aamas12-saves-camera-ready-final.pdf
Manish Jain, Bo An, and Milind Tambe. 2012. “Security Games Applied to Real-World: Research Contributions and Challenges.” In In S. Jajodia, A.K. Ghosh, V.S. Subramanian, V. Swarup, C. Wang, and X. S. Wang editors Moving Target Defense II: Application of Game Theory and Adversarial Modeling, Springer .Abstract
The goal of this chapter is to introduce a challenging real-world problem for researchers in multiagent systems and beyond, where our collective efforts may have a significant impact on activities in the real-world. The challenge is in applying game theory for security: our goal is not only to introduce the problem, but also to provide exemplars of initial successes of deployed systems in this problem arena. Furthermore, we present key ideas and algorithms for solving and understanding the characteristics large-scale real-world security games, and then present some key open research challenges in this area.
2012_35_teamcore_manish.pdf
Thanh H. Nguyen, Jason Tsai, Albert Jiang, Emma Bowring, Rajiv Maheswaran, and Milind Tambe. 2012. “Security Games on Social Networks .” In AAAI Fall Symposium, 2012 .Abstract
Many real-world problems exhibit competitive situations in which a defender (a defending agent, agency, or organization) has to address misinformation spread by its adversary, e.g., health organizations cope with vaccination-related misinformation provided by anti-vaccination groups. The rise of social networks has allowed misinformation to be easily and quickly diffused to a large community. Taking into account knowledge of its adversary’s actions, the defender has to seek efficient strategies to limit the influence of the spread of misinformation by the opponent. In this paper, we address this problem as a blocking influence maximization problem using a game-theoretic approach. Two players strategically select a number of seed nodes in the social network that could initiate their own influence propagation. While the adversary attempts to maximize its negative influence, the defender tries to minimize this influence. We represent the problem as a zero-sum game and apply the Double Oracle algorithm to solve the game in combination with various heuristics for oracle phases. Our experimental results reveal that by using the game theoretic approach, we are able to significantly reduce the negative influence in comparison to when the defender does not do anything. In addition, we propose using an approximation of the payoff matrix, making the algorithms scalable to large real-world networks.
2012_41_teamcore_security_games_on_social_networks.pdf
Bo An, David Kempe, Christopher Kiekintveld, Eric Shieh, Satinder Singh, Milind Tambe, and Yevgeniy Vorobeychik. 2012. “Security Games with Limited Surveillance .” In Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI) .Abstract
Randomized first-mover strategies of Stackelberg games are used in several deployed applications to allocate limited resources for the protection of critical infrastructure. Stackelberg games model the fact that a strategic attacker can surveil and exploit the defender’s strategy, and randomization guards against the worst effects by making the defender less predictable. In accordance with the standard game-theoretic model of Stackelberg games, past work has typically assumed that the attacker has perfect knowledge of the defender’s randomized strategy and will react correspondingly. In light of the fact that surveillance is costly, risky, and delays an attack, this assumption is clearly simplistic: attackers will usually act on partial knowledge of the defender’s strategies. The attacker’s imperfect estimate could present opportunities and possibly also threats to a strategic defender. In this paper, we therefore begin a systematic study of security games with limited surveillance. We propose a natural model wherein an attacker forms or updates a belief based on observed actions, and chooses an optimal response. We investigate the model both theoretically and experimentally. In particular, we give mathematical programs to compute optimal attacker and defender strategies for a fixed observation duration, and show how to use them to estimate the attacker’s observation durations. Our experimental results show that the defender can achieve significant improvement in expected utility by taking the attacker’s limited surveillance into account, validating the motivation of our work.
2012_25_teamcore_boan_aaai12.pdf
Bo An, David Kempe, Christopher Kiekintveld, Eric Shieh, Satinder Singh, Milind Tambe, and Yevgeniy Vorobeychik. 2012. “Security Games with Limited Surveillance: An Initial Report.” In AAAI Spring Symposium on Game Theory for Security, Sustainability and Health.Abstract
Stackelberg games have been used in several deployed applications of game theory to make recommendations for allocating limited resources for protecting critical infrastructure. The resource allocation strategies are randomized to prevent a strategic attacker from using surveillance to learn and exploit patterns in the allocation. An important limitation of previous work on security games is that it typically assumes that attackers have perfect surveillance capabilities, and can learn the exact strategy of the defender. We introduce a new model that explicitly models the process of an attacker observing a sequence of resource allocation decisions and updating his beliefs about the defender’s strategy. For this model we present computational techniques for updating the attacker’s beliefs and computing optimal strategies for both the attacker and defender, given a specific number of observations. We provide multiple formulations for computing the defender’s optimal strategy, including non-convex programming and a convex approximation. We also present an approximate method for computing the optimal length of time for the attacker to observe the defender’s strategy before attacking. Finally, we present experimental results comparing the efficiency and runtime of our methods.
2012_7_teamcore_aaaiss_final.pdf
J. Tsai, E. Bowring, S. Marsella, W. Wood, and M. Tambe. 2012. “A Study of Emotional Contagion with Virtual Characters .” In International Conference on Intelligent Virtual Agents (IVA) (short paper) .Abstract
In social psychology, emotional contagion describes the widely observed phenomenon of one person’s emotions mimicking surrounding people’s emotions [10]. In this paper, we perform a battery of experiments to explore the existence of agent-human emotional contagion. The first study is a betweensubjects design, wherein subjects were shown an image of a character’s face with either a neutral or happy expression. Findings indicate that even a still image induces a very strong increase in self-reported happiness between Neutral and Happy conditions with all characters tested. In a second study, we examine the effect of a virtual character’s presence in a strategic situation by presenting subjects with a modernized Stag Hunt game. Our experiments show that the contagion effect is substantially dampened and does not cause a consistent impact on behavior. A third study explores the impact of the strategic decision within the Stag Hunt and conducts the same experiment using a description of the same strategic situation with the decision already made. We find that the emotional impact returns, implying that the contagion effect is substantially lessened in the presence of a strategic decision.
2012_39_teamcore_20120625_iva_camera_ready_v2.pdf
Jun-young Kwak, Pradeep Varakantham, Rajiv Maheswaran, Milind Tambe, Farrokh Jazizadeh, Geoffrey Kavulya, Laura Klein, Burcin Becerik-Gerber, Timothy Hayes, and Wendy Wood. 2012. “Sustainable Multiagent Application to Conserve Energy .” In International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS) Demonstration Track .Abstract
Limited availability of energy resources has motivated the need for developing efficient measures of conserving energy. Conserving energy in commercial buildings is an important goal since these buildings consume significant amount of energy, e.g., 46.2% of all building energy and 18.4% of total energy consumption in the US [1]. This demonstration focuses on a novel application to be deployed at Ralph & Goldy Lewis Hall (RGL) at the University of Southern California as a practical research testbed to optimize multiple competing objectives: i) energy use in the building; ii) occupants’ comfort level; and iii) practical usage considerations. This demonstration complements our paper in the AAMAS innovative applications track [4], presenting a novel multiagent building application for sustainability called SAVES (Sustainable multiAgent systems for optimizing Variable objectives including Energy and Satisfaction). This writeup will provide a high-level overview of SAVES and focus more on the proposed demonstration, but readers are referred to [4] for a more technical description. SAVES provides three key contributions: (i) jointly performed with the university facility management team, our research is based on actual building and occupant data as well as real sensors and devices, etc.; (ii) it focuses on non-residential buildings, where human occupants do not have a direct financial incentive in saving energy; and (iii) SAVES uses a novel algorithm for generating optimal BM-MDP (Bounded parameter Multi-objective MDP) policies. We demonstrate SAVES to show how to achieve significant energy savings and comparable average satisfaction level of occupants while emphasizing the interactive aspects of our application.
2012_21_teamcore_aamas12-energy-demo-camera-ready.pdf
Albert Xin Jiang, Zhengyu Yin, Matthew P. Johnson, Christopher Kiekintveld, Kevin Leyton-Brown, Tuomas Sandholm, and Milind Tambe. 2012. “Towards Optimal Patrol Strategies for Fare Inspection in Transit Systems .” In AAAI Spring Symposium on Game Theory for Security, Sustainability and Health .Abstract
In some urban transit systems, passengers are legally required to purchase tickets before entering but are not physically forced to do so. Instead, patrol units move about through the transit system, inspecting tickets of passengers, who face fines for fare evasion. This setting yields the problem of computing optimal patrol strategies satisfying certain temporal and spacial constraints, to deter fare evasion and hence maximize revenue. In this paper we propose an initial model of this problem as a leader-follower Stackelberg game. We then formulate an LP relaxation of this problem and present initial experimental results using real-world ridership data from the Los Angeles Metro Rail system.
2012_10_teamcore_trustsrail.pdf
Jun-young Kwak, Pradeep Varakantham, Rajiv Maheswaran, Milind Tambe, Timothy Hayes, Wendy Wood, and Burcin Becerik-Gerber. 2012. “Towards Robust Multi-objective Optimization Under Model Uncertainty for Energy Conservation .” In Workshop on Agent Technologies for Energy Systems (ATES) at AAMAS .Abstract
to the significant growth in energy usage. Building multiagent systems for real-world energy applications raises several research challenges regarding scalability, optimizing multiple competing objectives, model uncertainty, and complexity in deploying the system. Motivated by these challenges, this paper proposes a new approach to effectively conserve building energy. This work contributes to a very new area that requires considering large-scale multi-objective optimization as well as uncertainty over occupant preferences when negotiating energy reduction. There are three major contributions. We (i) develop a new method called HRMM to compute robust solutions in practical situations; (ii) experimentally show that obtained strategies from HRMM converge to near-optimal solutions; and (iii) provide a systematic way to tightly incorporate the insights from human subject studies into our computational model and algorithms. The HRMM method is verified in a validated simulation testbed in terms of energy savings and comfort levels of occupants
2012_30_teamcore_ates12-workshop-camera-ready-final.pdf
Zhengyu Yin, Albert Xin Jiang, Milind Tambe, Christopher Kiekintveld, Kevin Leyton-Brown, Tuomas Sandholm, and John P. Sullivan. 2012. “TRUSTS: Scheduling Randomized Patrols for Fare Inspection in Transit Systems using Game Theory .” AI Magazine, 33 , 4 , Pp. 59-72.Abstract
In proof-of-payment transit systems, passengers are legally required to purchase tickets before entering but are not physically forced to do so. Instead, patrol units move about the transit system, inspecting the tickets of passengers, who face fines if caught fare evading. The deterrence of fare evasion depends on the unpredictability and effectiveness of the patrols. In this paper, we present TRUSTS, an application for scheduling randomized patrols for fare inspection in transit systems. TRUSTS models the problem of computing patrol strategies as a leader-follower Stackelberg game where the objective is to deter fare evasion and hence maximize revenue. This problem differs from previously studied Stackelberg settings in that the leader strategies must satisfy massive temporal and spatial constraints; moreover, unlike in these counterterrorism-motivated Stackelberg applications, a large fraction of the ridership might realistically consider fare evasion, and so the number of followers is potentially huge. A third key novelty in our work is deliberate simplification of leader strategies to make patrols easier to be executed. We present an efficient algorithm for computing such patrol strategies and present experimental results using real-world ridership data from the Los Angeles Metro Rail system. The Los Angeles County Sheriff’s department is currently carrying out trials of TRUSTS.
2012_45_teamcore_aimag-trusts.pdf
Zhengyu Yin, Albert Jiang, Matthew Johnson, Milind Tambe, Christopher Kiekintveld, Kevin Leyton-Brown, Tuomas Sandholm, and John Sullivan. 2012. “TRUSTS: Scheduling Randomized Patrols for Fare Inspection in Transit Systems .” In Conference on Innovative Applications of Artificial Intelligence (IAAI) .Abstract
In proof-of-payment transit systems, passengers are legally required to purchase tickets before entering but are not physically forced to do so. Instead, patrol units move about the transit system, inspecting the tickets of passengers, who face fines if caught fare evading. The deterrence of such fines depends on the unpredictability and effectiveness of the patrols. In this paper, we present TRUSTS, an application for scheduling randomized patrols for fare inspection in transit systems. TRUSTS models the problem of computing patrol strategies as a leader-follower Stackelberg game where the objective is to deter fare evasion and hence maximize revenue. This problem differs from previously studied Stackelberg settings in that the leader strategies must satisfy massive temporal and spatial constraints; moreover, unlike in these counterterrorism-motivated Stackelberg applications, a large fraction of the ridership might realistically consider fare evasion, and so the number of followers is potentially huge. A third key novelty in our work is deliberate simplification of leader strategies to make patrols easier to be executed. We present an efficient algorithm for computing such patrol strategies and present experimental results using realworld ridership data from the Los Angeles Metro Rail system. The Los Angeles Sheriff’s department has begun trials of TRUSTS.
2012_13_teamcore_matchextendedabstract.pdf
Zhengyu Yin and Milind Tambe. 2012. “A Unified Method for Handling Discrete and Continuous Uncertainty in Bayesian Stackelberg Games .” In International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS).Abstract
Given their existing and potential real-world security applications, Bayesian Stackelberg games have received significant research interest [3, 12, 8]. In these games, the defender acts as a leader, and the many different follower types model the uncertainty over discrete attacker types. Unfortunately since solving such games is an NP-hard problem, scale-up has remained a difficult challenge. This paper scales up Bayesian Stackelberg games, providing a novel unified approach to handling uncertainty not only over discrete follower types but also other key continuously distributed real world uncertainty, due to the leader’s execution error, the follower’s observation error, and continuous payoff uncertainty. To that end, this paper provides contributions in two parts. First, we present a new algorithm for Bayesian Stackelberg games, called HUNTER, to scale up the number of types. HUNTER combines the following five key features: i) efficient pruning via a best-first search of the leader’s strategy space; ii) a novel linear program for computing tight upper bounds for this search; iii) using Bender’s decomposition for solving the upper bound linear program efficiently; iv) efficient inheritance of Bender’s cuts from parent to child; v) an efficient heuristic branching rule. Our experiments show that HUNTER provides orders of magnitude speedups over the best existing methods to handle discrete follower types. In the second part, we show HUNTER’s efficiency for Bayesian Stackelberg games can be exploited to also handle the continuous uncertainty using sample average approximation. We experimentally show that our HUNTER-based approach also outperforms latest robust solution methods under continuously distributed uncertainty.
2012_11_teamcore_hunter-aamas12.pdf
Manish Jain, Kevin Leyton-Brown, and Milind Tambe. 2012. “Which Security Games are Hard to Solve? .” In AAAI Spring Symposium on Game Theory for Security, Sustainability and Health .Abstract
Stackelberg security games form the backbone of systems like ARMOR, IRIS and PROTECT, which are in regular use by the Los Angeles International Police, US Federal Air Marshal Service and the US Coast Guard respectively. An understanding of the runtime required by algorithms that power such systems is critical to furthering the application of game theory to other real-world domains. This paper identifies the concept of the deployment-to-saturation ratio in random Stackelberg security games, and shows that in a decision problem related to these games, the probability that a solution exists exhibits a phase transition as the ratio crosses 0.5. We demonstrate that this phase transition is invariant to changes both in the domain and the domain representation. Moreover, problem instances at this phase transition point are computationally harder than instances with other deployment-tosaturation ratios for a wide range of different equilibrium computation methods, including (i) previously published different MIP algorithms, and (ii) different underlying solvers and solution mechanisms. Our findings have at least two important implications. First, it is important for new algorithms to be evaluated on the hardest problem instances. We show that this has often not been done in the past, and introduce a publicly available benchmark suite to facilitate such comparisons. Second, we provide evidence that this phase transition region is also one where optimization would be of most benefit to security agencies, and thus requires significant attention from researchers in this area.
2012_20_teamcore_aaaiss_manish.pdf
Manish Jain, Bo An, and Milind Tambe. 2012. “An Overview of Recent Application Trends at the AAMAS conference: Security, Sustainability and Safety.” AI Magazine, 33, 3, Pp. 14-28.Abstract
A key feature of the AAMAS conference is its emphasis on ties to real-world applications. The focus of this article is to provide a broad overview of application-focused papers published at the AAMAS 2010 and 2011 conferences. More specifically, recent applications at AAMAS could be broadly categorized as belonging to research areas of security, sustainability and safety. We outline the domains of applications, key research thrusts underlying each such application area, and emerging trends.
2012_1_teamcore_aimag2012.pdf
Jason Tsai, Thanh H. Nguyen, and Milind Tambe. 2012. “Security Games for Controlling Contagion.” In Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI).Abstract
Many strategic actions carry a ‘contagious’ component beyond the immediate locale of the effort itself. Viral marketing and peacekeeping operations have both been observed to have a spreading effect. In this work, we use counterinsurgency as our illustrative domain. Defined as the effort to block the spread of support for an insurgency, such operations lack the manpower to defend the entire population and must focus on the opinions of a subset of local leaders. As past researchers of security resource allocation have done, we propose using game theory to develop such policies and model the interconnected network of leaders as a graph. Unlike this past work in security games, actions in these domains possess a probabilistic, non-local impact. To address this new class of security games, we combine recent research in influence blocking maximization with a double oracle approach and create novel heuristic oracles to generate mixed strategies for a real-world leadership network from Afghanistan, synthetic leadership networks, and a real social network. We find that leadership networks that exhibit highly interconnected clusters can be solved equally well by our heuristic methods, but our more sophisticated heuristics outperform simpler ones in less interconnected social networks.
2012_27_teamcore_aaai2012_-_camerareadyv6.pdf
2011
Manish Jain, Zhengyu Yin, Milind Tambe, and Fernando Ordonez. 2011. “Addressing Execution and Observation Error in Security Games .” In AAAI'11 Workshop on Applied Adversarial Reasoning and Risk Modeling (AARM).Abstract
Attacker-defender Stackelberg games have become a popular game-theoretic approach for security with deployments for LAX Police, the FAMS and the TSA. Unfortunately, most of the existing solution approaches do not model two key uncertainties of the real-world: there may be noise in the defender’s execution of the suggested mixed strategy and/or the observations made by an attacker can be noisy. In this paper, we analyze a framework to model these uncertainties, and demonstrate that previous strategies perform poorly in such uncertain settings. We also analyze RECON, a novel algorithm that computes strategies for the defender that are robust to such uncertainties, and explore heuristics that further improve RECON’s efficiency.
2011_30_teamcore_aarm11_recon.pdf
Matthew Brown, Emma Bowring, Shira Epstein, Mufaddal Jhaveri, Rajiv Maheswaran, Parag Mallick, Shannon Mumenthaler, Michelle Povinelli, and Milind Tambe. 2011. “Applying Multi-Agent Techniques to Cancer Modeling .” In Workshop on Multiagent Sequential Decision Making in Uncertain Domains(MSDM) at AAMAS 2011 .Abstract
Each year, cancer is responsible for 13% of all deaths worldwide. In the United States, that percentage increases to 25%, translating to an estimated 569,490 deaths in 2010 [1]. Despite significant advances in the fight against cancer, these statistics make clear the need for additional research into new treatments. As such, there has been growing interest in the use of computer simulations as a tool to aid cancer researchers. We propose an innovative multi-agent approach in which healthy cells and cancerous cells are modeled as opposing teams of agents using a decentralized Markov decision process (DEC-MDP). We then describe changes made to traditional DEC-MDP algorithms in order to better handle the complexity and scale of our domain. We conclude by presenting and analyzing preliminary simulation results. This paper is intended to introduce the cancer modeling domain to the multi-agent community with the hope of fostering a discussion about the opportunities and challenges it presents. Given the complexity of the domain, we do not claim our approach to be a definitive solution but rather a first step toward the larger goal of creating realistic simulations of cancer.
2011_16_teamcore_msdm2011_brown.pdf
Christopher Kiekintveld, Janusz Marecki, and Milind Tambe. 2011. “Approximation Methods for Infinite Bayesian Stackelberg Games: Modeling Distributional Payoff Uncertainty.” In International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems.Abstract
Game theory is fast becoming a vital tool for reasoning about complex real-world security problems, including critical infrastructure protection. The game models for these applications are constructed using expert analysis and historical data to estimate the values of key parameters, including the preferences and capabilities of terrorists. In many cases, it would be natural to represent uncertainty over these parameters using continuous distributions (such as uniform intervals or Gaussians). However, existing solution algorithms are limited to considering a small, finite number of possible attacker types with different payoffs. We introduce a general model of infinite Bayesian Stackelberg security games that allows payoffs to be represented using continuous payoff distributions. We then develop several techniques for finding approximate solutions for this class of games, and show empirically that our methods offer dramatic improvements over the current state of the art, providing new ways to improve the robustness of security game models.
2011_9_teamcore_aamas11_kiekintveld.pdf
Zhengyu Yin and Milind Tambe. 2011. “Continuous Time Planning for Multiagent Teams with Temporal Constraints .” In International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI).Abstract
Continuous state DEC-MDPs are critical for agent teams in domains involving resources such as time, but scaling them up is a significant challenge. To meet this challenge, we first introduce a novel continuous-time DEC-MDP model that exploits transition independence in domains with temporal constraints. More importantly, we present a new locally optimal algorithm called SPAC. Compared to the best previous algorithm, SPAC finds solutions of comparable quality substantially faster; SPAC also scales to larger teams of agents.
2011_24_teamcore_ijcai11_mctmdp.pdf
Matthew E. Taylor, Manish Jain, Prateek Tandon, Milind Tambe, and Makoto Yokoo. 2011. “Distributed On-line Multi-Agent Optimization Under Uncertainty: Balancing Exploration and Exploitation .” In Advances in Complex Systems.Abstract
A significant body of work exists on effectively allowing multiple agents to coordinate to achieve a shared goal. In particular, a growing body of work in the Distributed Constraint Optimization (DCOP) framework enables such coordination with different amounts of teamwork. Such algorithms can implicitly or explicitly trade-off improved solution quality with increased communication and computation requirements. However, the DCOP framework is limited to planning problems; DCOP agents must have complete and accurate knowledge about the reward function at plan time. We extend the DCOP framework, defining the Distributed Coordination of Exploration and Exploitation (DCEE) problem class to address real-world problems, such as ad-hoc wireless network optimization, via multiple novel algorithms. DCEE algorithms differ from DCOP algorithms in that they (1) are limited to a finite number of actions in a single trial, (2) attempt to maximize the on-line, rather than final, reward, (3) are unable to exhaustively explore all possible actions, and (4) may have knowledge about the distribution of rewards in the environment, but not the rewards themselves. Thus, a DCEE problem is not a type of planning problem, as DCEE algorithms must carefully balance and coordinate multiple agents’ exploration and exploitation. Two classes of algorithms are introduced: static estimation algorithms perform simple calculations that allow agents to either stay or explore, and balanced exploration algorithms use knowledge about the distribution of the rewards and the time remaining in an experiment to decide whether to stay, explore, or (in some algorithms) backtrack to a previous location. These two classes of DCEE algorithms are compared in simulation and on physical robots in a complex mobile ad-hoc wireless network setting. Contrary to our expectations, we found that increasing teamwork in DCEE algorithms may lower team performance. In contrast, agents running DCOP algorithms improve their reward as teamwork increases. We term this previously unknown phenomenon the team uncertainty penalty, analyze it in both simulation and on robots, and present techniques to ameliorate the penalty.
2011_20_teamcore_11acs_taylor_revision.pdf

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